

28 October 1957

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

DOCUMENT NO. 32  
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DATE 4-79-80 REVIEWER: 372044

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am forwarding to you for your information and such use as you see fit a letter to me from certain CIA consultants.

On 22 October, these consultants met with me and members of my staff after a detailed review of the intelligence on the Soviet missile programs and expressed great concern over the progress of the USSR in guided missiles and related fields.

I have high confidence in the technical competence of these gentlemen. They were brought into the intelligence effort in 1954 and have worked with us in the preparation and review of guided missile estimates ever since. We have kept them briefed on intelligence developments and they, in turn, have given us valuable technical assistance.

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Copies of the attached letter are being forwarded to General Goodpaster for the President and to the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely,

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

Enclosure

Ltr dtd 23 Oct 57  
(TS 115989)

Identical letter sent to Secretary of Defense

TS 115989/d  
Copy 2 of 14

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Amory, DD/I		
2	[REDACTED]		
3	[REDACTED]		
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
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<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

**Remarks:**

Bob: The Director would like to send copies of the attached to the Secretaries of State and Defense and to Andy Goodpaster for the President. He has asked that you have prepared a letter of transmittal indicating who the authors of the report are and why it was prepared.



FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
[REDACTED] Executive Officer [REDACTED]		27 Oct 57
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<p align="center"><b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b></p>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		INITIALS	DATE	
1	DD/1		ML		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
<p><b>Remarks:</b></p> <p>A meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow morning at 9:30 AM, on the subject I discussed with you and Mr. Amory this morning, between Adm. Strauss, Gen. Cutler, Dr. Rabi, Mr. Gray, and the PRESIDENT. It would be highly desirable that the <u>attached material</u> is in Goodpaster's or the <u>President's hands</u> prior to that meeting.</p> <p align="right">H. Snowville, Jr.</p>					
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Washington, D. C.  
23 October 1957

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

This letter will confirm our conversation of 22 October during which we stated to you that we believed the United States is in a period of national emergency.

We spent the day preceding our conversation with you in reviewing and discussing evidence regarding the Soviet guided missile program, particularly those aspects dealing with offensive ballistic missiles. The data proves beyond question that the Russians have an orderly and progressive program which is being prosecuted in an aggressive and intelligent manner. The program does not appear to us to be of a "crash" nature but rather one that has been thoroughly thought out and followed for years. One of the most disturbing features revealed is the high level of Soviet competence in achieving their planned goals. Just two points will illustrate this conclusion:



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Mr. Allen W. Dulles

23 October 1957

As mentioned above, the progression in their ballistic missile program [redacted] an ICBM, and earth satellite, illustrates thoroughly the soundest technical concept and execution. This program is likewise supported by highly reliable rocket motors [redacted]. This latter motor, [redacted] is about fifty percent more powerful than the largest American motor, and probably is an essential element of the Soviet ICBM. Inasmuch as precise guidance and dependable propulsion are the chief factors in an ICBM, we must conclude that the USSR can have some (a dozen) operational missiles by the end of 1958. We must also conclude that significant quantities of these missiles (with atomic warheads) are not large quantities and could be produced fairly rapidly.

Our high concern has resulted from our knowledge of the US program (acquired from our official military connections) and our comparison of the US and USSR programs. Although we realize intelligence has no responsibility for making comparisons of this nature, omission would remove basis for concern. US experience in ballistic missiles does not match that of the USSR and in our opinion is lagging by two to three years. We submit that there is no spot remedy that will eliminate this critical difference in capabilities within any short time period. Rather, only by the most determined and concentrated US effort, extending over a period of several years, will we raise our experience level again to a par with the USSR.

Not immediately akin but very closely connected, it is our belief that guided missile intelligence must be more closely interwoven both within itself and with the US research and development program such that intelligence may be able to arrive at firmer conclusions on a greatly accelerated time base. Inasmuch as national policy decisions are being made in Washington, intelligence, to be timely, also needs be accomplished in Washington. For this reason, we submit that the technical competence of CIA should be expanded without delay and that direct connections between CIA and US missile contractors be effected.

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Mr. Allen W. Dulles

23 October 1957

We note that the guided missile intelligence community has initiated some technical studies which might lead to a refinement in the military characteristics of an ICBM. While refinement of estimates is required, such should not obscure nor delay the basic fact of the near existence of a Soviet operational ICBM.

Your consultant panel believes, as stated before, that the country is in a period of grave national emergency and that it will only be by the most intelligent and coordinated efforts of all concerned over a period of some years before such an emergency can be eliminated. In parallel, we cannot emphasize too much that increased efforts by the intelligence community, both overt and covert, are mandatory to counter this threat.



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